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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
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3	JILL BLOOMBERG,		
4	Plaintiff,		
5	v.	17 CV 3136 (PGG)	
6	THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and CARMEN FARINA,		
7	Defendants.	Motion Conference	
8	x		
9		New York, N.Y.	
10		May 1, 2017 3:10 p.m.	
11	Before:	-	
12	HON. PAUL G. GARDEPHE		
13		District Judge	
14		Discrice suage	
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18	APPEARANCES		
19	MIRER MAZZOCCHI SCHALET & JULIEN, PLLC Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: JEANNE E. MIRER		
20			
21	MARIA L. CHICKENDANTZ		
22	ZACHARY W. CARTER  Corporation Counsel for the City of New York  Attorney for Defendants  ANDREA M. O'CONNOR  WILLIAM A. GREY  Assistant Corporation Counsel		
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(Case called)

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THE COURT: This is a hearing on plaintiff Jill Bloomberg's application for a contemporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The plaintiff is the principal of Park Slope Collegiate, which I will be referring to as "PSC," which I understand to be one of a number of public secondary schools co-located at the John Jay Educational Complex in Brooklyn. Citing the complaint docket number 1, paragraphs 4, 10 through 11, and 22.

The other schools are the Secondary School for Journalism, the John Jay School for Law, and Millennium Brooklyn High School. According to plaintiff, the students at PSC, Journalism, and Law are predominantly African-American or Hispanic, while the students at Millennium are 50 percent African-American or Hispanic, and the remaining white or Caucasian. Citing the Bloomberg affidavit docket number 10 Exhibit 3.

Plaintiff has been employed by the New York City
Department of Education since 1998 and has served as PSC's
principal for the past 13 years. Citing the complaint
paragraphs 10 through 11. According to the complaint,
throughout her 13 years at PSC, plaintiff has been an
"outspoken advocate" and has encouraged desegregation at PSC
and "opposed measures that reinforce and perpetuate de facto
segregation, such as student tracking and instituting gifted

and talented programs." <a href="Id.">Id.</a> at 31.

The complaint alleges that on March 2, 2017, the department of education's office of special investigations, or OSI, informed plaintiff that she is under investigation.

Citing the complaint paragraph 60. The OSI informed plaintiff that it is investigating allegations that plaintiff and two PSC teachers are "members of a Communist organization known as the Progressive Labor Party, that they are actively recruiting students in the organization during school hours, and that they invite students to participate in the organization's activities, including marches for Communism." Citing the April 6, 2017, OSI letter docket number 10-8; the Guerra declaration docket number 17 at paragraphs 11 through 16, 31 through 35.

The OSI contends that the allegations, if substantiated, may constitute a violation of certain DOE regulations, including chancellor's regulation D130, which prohibits employee involvement in any activities of political organizations during working hours. <u>Id</u>. See also Chickendantz affirmation, docket number 4, Exhibit B, at page 2.

As part of the investigation, the OSI has sent subpoenss to other PSC employees requesting their appearance at interviews. Citing the Bloomberg affidavit docket number 10 at paragraph 34. Plaintiff contends that the OSI's investigation is baseless and was initiated in retaliation for a January 10, 2017, email she sent to Eric Goldstein, who oversees the DOE's

Public School Athletic League, and DOE superintendent Michael Prayor, complaining that the DOE is "operating two separate and unequal sports programs" at the John Jay educational complex.

Citing the complaint, docket number 1, 55-56 and 71; the Bloomberg affidavit, docket number 10 Exhibit 3. The email states that students at the complex's predominantly black and Latino schools, are offered fewer supports teams that the students at Millennium, which, as I noted, is about 50 percent white. Id.

Plaintiff commenced this action on April 28, 2017, asserting claims for retaliation under the First Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Plaintiff has moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining the OSI's investigation pending the outcome of this litigation.

Ms. Mirer, I'm happy to hear what you have to say in support of the application.

MS. MIRER: Thank you, your Honor.

We received the opposition papers this morning at 10 o'clock and have had a chance to review them. In terms of the application, we believe that, first of all, with respect to the elements of an injunction, we meet all of them.

With respect to the First Amendment chilling effect, we have submitted affidavits from not only Ms. Bloomberg but also several teachers and administrative staff who have also made statements, which I can quote if the Court is so inclined.

The affidavits are in the record. They are basically saying that they feel there has been a huge impact on the school.

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For example, in paragraph 7 of the affidavit of Rahsan Williams, he says, "The OSI investigation against Jill has eroded the trust and commitment we have spent years building. It has made me fearful of standing up for our students and speaking out against race discrimination because I'm afraid that my speaking out against racism will be seen as investigation—worthy by DOE. It has been difficult to maintain my morale knowing that I can no longer fight integration and anti-racism. Hence, that activity now comes with the possibility of losing my teaching license."

He also says, "The investigation has splintered the staff and the school environment I once considered a second home. Because of this investigation of Principal Bloomberg, PSC has become a place wrought with tension, fear, and suspicion. Teachers who wholeheartedly support Jill are afraid to provide affidavits of support in fear of retaliation from the DOE. A few teachers have made it clear that they are considering applying to other schools because of the chilling effect of this investigation has had on our school environment. The investigation is a great disservice to our students and our families."

THE COURT: Let me break in. First let me say, let me say this to both sides. I have read all the papers. It is

pointless to read things that you have already told me, because I have already read it. I don't need to hear it again.

There are a few points that I want you to address, Ms. Mirer, either this afternoon or in papers. Let me say at the outset that I am going to give you an opportunity to submit a reply to what the city submitted. Let me identify for you a number of the issues I am concerned about. You are welcome to tell me whatever you want to tell me, but I am going to tell you what is on my mind.

The first thing I would mention that is on my mind is the issue of whether the January 10, 2017, email that you claim was the catalyst for the city's act of retaliation, what you claim to be retaliation. My question is whether that email was sent by Ms. Bloomberg in connection with her official duties as the principal of PSC or rather simply as a citizen of New York City. That's question number one.

Question number two: With respect to the point you were telling me about chilling effect, the significance in your view of the fact that you were able to obtain five affidavits from PSC employees who are well aware of the investigation but nonetheless felt free to express their viewpoint in the form of the affidavits they submitted, not to mention the petition that apparently was signed by 500 people or so, both of which would tend to suggest that the First Amendment is alive and well at PSC.

A third question: whether the initiation of an investigation is sufficient to constitute adverse action for purposes of the retaliation claim brought under the First Amendment, Title VI, or the New York City Human Rights Law.

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You repeatedly assert both in your papers, your brief, as well as I think in your affidavit -- or maybe this is Ms.

Chickendantz's affidavit, I'm not sure which -- but the point is that you assert that it is obvious that the initiation of the investigation constitutes adverse action.

"Adverse action," of course, is a legal term. We don't speak of it in colloquial terms. It has a definite meaning under the law. The question is whether the mere initiation of an investigation here is sufficient to constitute adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, Title VI, or the New York City Human Rights Law.

You cited no cases, zero cases, for the proposition that the mere initiation of an investigation is sufficient.

Your adversary has cited a number of cases for the proposition that an investigation standing alone is not sufficient. I am going to want you to address that. I am going to want you to cite case law to me showing that the mere initiation of investigation is enough to constitute an adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim.

Fourth question. I want you to address the time line

of the investigation and in particular the city's assertion that the investigation was actually opened in May of 2016, after the city received an anonymous tip concerning your client. The investigation was closed, according to the city, because of a lack of information to substantiate the anonymous tip. But then it was reopened later, after the city received additional information. I want you to address that.

Then the fifth question, last question. The defendants have said that neither the special commissioner for investigation nor the OSI knew about Ms. Bloomberg's January 10, 2017, email at the time they commenced the investigation. Their point is the January 10, 2017, email couldn't have had anything to do with them commencing the investigation because they didn't even know about it.

Those are five issues that I want addressed. As I said, you are welcome to tell me whatever you wish now, but I am going to give you the opportunity to respond in writing in the nature of a reply which you can submit by 5 o'clock tomorrow.

MS. MIRER: Thank you, your Honor. I will address some of them just briefly.

With respect to your first question, the issue of whether she is speaking as a citizen we think is covered by the case of Matthews v. City of New York, which is I believe directly on point. It's a case of a police officer who

reported the use of quotas for tickets and stop-and-frisks, and the court found that he was speaking as a public citizen on an issue of public concern.

THE COURT: Isn't the difference that the officer wasn't responsible for the quota system, if there was one, but here, as part of Ms. Bloomberg's daily responsibilities, she presumably has some responsibility for resources at the school? She has an obligation to see that the students at PSC are receiving adequate resources.

I have to tell you that when I reviewed her email, it sounded much to me like an email you might expect to see from any person of authority at a school who feels that their students are not receiving what they should be receiving in terms of resources from the department of education.

This was in the context of sports and the number of sports teams that were made available at PSC versus the number of sports teams made available at Millennium. The point was made that the PSC and the other schools were principally African-American and Hispanic students whereas the Millennium school was about 50-50. That point was made.

Other than that, it seemed to me very similar to what I would expect countless principals have communicated to DOE on other occasions: that they feel like their school is not being properly treated, is not receiving the resources that it is entitled to, and that the students are being shortchanged as a

result. That's what it read like to me.

I'm familiar with the case you cited. I wonder whether it is exactly on point as you say. It seems to me that it might be the case here that Ms. Bloomberg's responsibilities actually involve the allocation of resources at her school, and that in speaking or in sending an email communication to DOE about her level of unhappiness with the resources that the school is receiving, it seems to me she might have been acting in her position as the principal of PSC rather than as a concerned citizen.

MS. MIRER: I understand your point, your Honor. I also would like to point out that part of the reason why we claim there is retaliation for the speaking out and raising these issues is this is not something that has been happening. In fact, it is something that principals have not been doing, and it's not been viewed as part of their job to do. In fact, a concerned citizen could do the same. A concerned parent could do the same.

Matthews. But we will provide you a step-by-step analysis of the Matthews case and why we think it is on point. We believe the citizen analog point is very well taken and that Ms. Bloomberg has, in essence, been doing things that the DOE seems not to have taken up as an issue and in fact never resolved the issue of resources. Even though they gave more sports teams to

the three majority black and Latino schools, they are still segregated within the school in terms of who they play with.

Nevertheless, we will definitely get you a step-by-step brief as to why we think she acted as a private citizen, understanding that she also has a claim under Title VI, which doesn't require that, and retaliation is outlawed under Title VI as well.

THE COURT: I understand that. I was speaking in terms of your First Amendment claim.

MS. MIRER: Absolutely.

With respect to the chilling effect in the affidavits and the fact that some people have been willing to come forward and say yes, I feel chilled, usually that doesn't happen. We are very glad at least some people are willing to say, I feel chilled, I feel this is a bad thing that is happening to the school, it's impacting the school in a very negative way. And they are saying, I'm afraid also in the future to speak out, which is another part of the chilling effect of the First Amendment.

So it is not something that we can say we just had some affidavits of people who say, yes, I'm chilled. There are 50 teachers at the school. Five of them were willing to come forward and complain about this investigation, just the mere initiation of it, and the basis of which it is has been initiated.

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Your Honor I don't think we would be here if on March 2nd Ms. Berchey came in and said there has been an allegation that the school was used wrongly after hours or that there was some kind of question of students being filmed in a movie that they didn't give authorizations for, the things that are now being said as the reason.

What they came in and said is she is being investigated for alleged Communist activities, which to me really does throw a whole different spin and a whole different McCarthyite kind of chill over the school. That's our position. I think the affidavits support it. But they also said there were others who are afraid to speak up in their affidavit. We will address that more in detail for the Court.

With respect to the question of initiation, whether or not it is an adverse action, with respect to First Amendment adverse action, the standard is that in retaliation cases all that is required to maintain a claim is to show that the action would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional right. This is stated in <u>Birch v. City of New York</u>, which is 184 F.Supp.3d 21, decided May 3, 2016, in the Eastern District of New York.

THE COURT: There are cases that actually have talked about whether the mere initiation of an investigation, without anything having happened in terms of negative consequences, whether that is good enough. There is a case called <u>Weber v.</u>

The City of New York, 973 F.Supp.2d 227, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), which includes the following quote.

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"Some courts have found that the commencement of an investigation, even without attendant negative consequences, is sufficient to establish an adverse employment action. However, there are other cases that have gone the opposite direction, specifically, Spaulding v. New York City Department of

Education, 2015 Westlaw 12645530, at \*39 (E.D.N.Y. February 19, 2015), where the court found that allegations of sexual conduct and a resulting OSI investigation did not constitute an adverse employment action."

Also, <u>Wright v. Monroe Community Hospital</u>, 2011
Westlaw 3236224, at \*7 (W.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011). "Employee investigations, unwanted scrutiny from supervisors in negative performance evaluations without attendant negative results, or deprivation of position/opportunity do not sufficiently constitute adverse employment actions under Title VII."

So there is a bit of a split of authority on the point. It appears we haven't completed our research on it. I welcome your citations. But suffice it to say that some courts have found that the mere initiation of an investigation is not sufficient to constitute an adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim.

MS. MIRER: We will definitely follow up on that, your Honor. I do not believe in <u>Spaulding</u> that the actual

allegation was that the OSI investigation was commenced. I believe it was allegations of false accusations. We will definitely address this issue in our brief to be filed by 5 o'clock tomorrow.

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On the issue of the date of the investigation starting in May, obviously we do believe that that supports our claim of retaliation in the sense that something was made anonymously in May, not viewed as sufficient to be a basis for an investigation, and closed.

THE COURT: They say they got more information I think it is on December 22, 2016. They say they got more information, and they say that the additional information allowed them to identify the person who provided the tip, and they say that they then interviewed that person and got additional information. And because of all of that, they say they reopened the investigation on February 1st.

MS. MIRER: We understand that that is their position, your Honor. We also know that on January 25th they sent this information to both the DOE, defendant in this case, and the OSI, making it clear that the DOE had notice of what was in these claims.

I do want to point out that with respect to each of those claims, for example, there is a theory or a statement made that the concern was that there was a movie -- many of these allegations are allegations that do not require an OSI

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invite. All of them we would say don't require an OSI investigation. If there is a concern as to whether or not an entity used a school building after hours, there are permits that are required to do that. They can check the permits.

There was a permit for the showing of a movie called Profiled in June of 2016. There was a permit for that. If there is an allegation that plaintiff's husband was somehow involved with a foundation that they claim is somehow connected to this political party, the foundation has a website. You can call up the foundation. You can find out what they did in terms of whether or not they gave money to the filmmaker. Not Jill Bloomberg, the filmmaker.

This film has been shown at Sun Dance, the Brooklyn Academy, the Brooklyn Museum, other places. It has won awards. This is a movie that they are talking about. This is information that could be --

THE COURT: I thought their point about the move was that, first of all, some students were shown in it without their permission. Then I thought they were saying that the movie was shown and people were charged admission to see it at the school. Did I misunderstand?

MS. MIRER: That's what their allegation is. But this is something that could have been verified with the filmmaker. The filmmaker, Karen Foster, is listed as the maker of the film. It's her obligation to get whatever releases she needs.

Ms. Bloomberg had nothing to do with that. She had nothing to do with the filming.

The fact that a foundation that is a public charity gave a grant along with many other funding institutions gave grants to help fund this movie has nothing to do with whether or not Jill Bloomberg did anything wrong. And these are things that could have been easily, easily looked into and found and verified with the filmmaker, with the foundation, with the permitting.

My understanding is that nobody was charged a fee. They were allowed to give a contribution if they so wanted. This is the kind of thing that could have easily been investigated independent of an OSI investigation.

THE COURT: You're saying it could easily be investigated but it can't be investigated by OSI?

MS. MIRER: What I'm saying is that the allegations that have come forward have really nothing to do with Jill Bloomberg.

THE COURT: I thought the city's position was that they had received a tip that they did have something to do with Ms. Bloomberg. Isn't that what they are saying?

MS. MIRER: They may have had a tip. But what we are saying is that if you're going to start an OSI investigation, which is no small matter -- it's no small matter for somebody to be under an OSI investigation. If you read the allegations

in terms of what does it mean, you're not told what it is about, you can be asked questions, you don't get to sign anything, it could be used against you. It could be a fishing expedition for somebody else's political vendetta. This is not any small matter, to open an investigation.

What I'm saying is that if there is a complaint and if one of the allegations is there was a movie shown at the building after hours, there is a way for them to find out without opening an investigation into Jill Bloomberg. There is a permit that is signed. You know who asked for the permit. You can talk to that person.

If there is an allegation that there is a foundation behind it, if there is an allegation that people didn't have signed releases, you talk to the filmmaker. You don't open an investigation into the principal of the school.

All I'm saying is that the reasonable person would know this. So unless they were really trying to find something that they could start an investigation on in retaliation for the actions that we say are protected, there would be no reason to rely on this kind of accusation.

There is an allegation that her husband was involved in this. That has nothing to do with Jill Bloomberg being a principal. Frankly, your Honor, if you read D130, it is absolutely clearly that D130 relates only to elected office. It does not relate to anybody's political views.

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THE COURT: It is clear, is it not, that a teacher or principal or an assistant principal can't promote any political organization, period? They are not allowed to do that during working hours at the school, are they? They are not allowed to promote any particular political party, are they?

MS. MIRER: This is what D130 days. "School buildings are not public forums for purposes of community or political expression. The following sets forth the rules which govern the use of access to the buildings," etc.

There are visits by people who are candidates for public office. It says while on duty or in contact with students, all school personnel.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I can't hear you.

MS. MIRER: This is subsection (c)(1) of D130. "While on duty or in contact with students, all school personnel shall maintain a posture of complete neutrality with respect to all candidates. Accordingly, while on duty in contact with students, school personnel may not wear buttons, pins, articles of clothing, or other items indicating a candidate, slate of candidates, or police organization committee."

The political organization that they are referring to is a political organization supporting a particular elective candidate.

THE COURT: You're arguing that it actually would be appropriate for a teacher or principal to actively recruit

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students to become members of a political organization during school hours? Is that your position? There isn't any regulation that prohibits that?

MS. MIRER: We don't think that D130 prohibits that, first of all. And Ms. Bloomberg has not done that. Ms. Bloomberg is a principal.

I read it to you at the outset. The city is alleging that they received a tip, an allegation from someone who says that she was recruiting students to join something called the Progressive Labor Party and that she was inviting them to participate in that organization's activities during school hours. That's what the city says. Whether that is true or not, I don't know, but they have definitely alleged that, no question about it.

I hear what you are saying about D130. But are you telling me there is no regulation that would prohibit a teacher or principal from attempting to recruit students who join a political party or to participate in the activities of a political party during school hours? Is it your position that there is no such regulation and that teachers and principals are in fact free to do that?

MS. MIRER: Your Honor, first of all, this reminds me of the <a href="Kramer">Kramer</a> case.

I want to back out a little bit because there has been

no specific allegation of time, place, date, specific students, what specific things, etc., that my client was alleged to do.

She denies doing that. She knows that her job is to be the principal and to advocate for the students, and she has put forward in her affidavit all of the things that she has done with respect to fighting against racism, fighting against criminalization of students, all of the things she feels had fostered the kind of very nurturing environment at that school.

With respect to the question of what happened in the Kramer case, your Honor -- I don't know if we mentioned it, but we will -- a teacher was giving a course on HIV/AIDS and she wound up asking the students what they thought in terms of -- it was part of sex education. She wound up putting on the board some words that were maybe vernacular for certain body parts having to do with sex. She was taken out of the classroom for eight months for doing this. Judge Weinstein found this particular rule that they cited for her was unconstitutionally vague.

At this point, if the school system wants to create some type of rule about what is or is not permissible speech during the day, about whether or not you can say I happen to believe this way but I'm not making anybody believe that way, or so on, if the school system wants to come out with some kind of regulation that is not vague and unconstitutionally overbroad, maybe we would say there might be a problem. But

right now under these allegations we don't know what she is charged with.

We know that there is some vague allegation of recruiting, there is some vague allegation of asking people to participate in marches. This is not something that you make an investigation for and put a well-respected principal under a microscope for. That's my position. We will argue it more specifically in our brief. We think that at this point what's happening is that the school system has backed off quite substantially from claiming that that is the issue.

(Pause)

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THE COURT: Go ahead.

I'm not exactly sure where I was. MS. MIRER:

The point you were making is you feel that the city has backed off some of the allegations that it made. I assume you're referring to the April 6th letter to Ms. Chickendantz. I think what you were telling me is you felt the city had backed off some of the allegations that were made in that letter. That's the point you were making a moment ago.

MS. MIRER: First of all, I want to say that I think the allegation about recruiting Communist activities, etc., I think that was in the May allegation which they closed. That's what my understanding is, and that they didn't revive it until there were these other things that related to the movie which was called Profile.

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THE COURT: All I know is I'm looking at an April 6th letter from I believe it is OSI to Ms. Chickendantz, and it says, "The complaint being investigated is that Jill Bloomberg and two teachers at the Park Slope Collegiate School are members of a Communist organization known as the Progressive Labor Party, that they are actively recruiting students in the organization during school hours, and that they invite students to participate in the organization's activities, including marches for Communism." That's April 6th. That's what they say on their investigation.

MS. MIRER: Right. In their affirmation to this Court, they say different things. They don't reiterate that. They talk about that her husband is involved in --

THE COURT: I agree with that. I'm looking at Charity Guerra's declaration. Paragraph 37 reads as follows. "OSI is conducting an investigation to ascertain whether plaintiff used her position as a DOE employee to advance the beliefs of a particular political party and engage in impermissible political activity in violation of chancellor's regulations and conflicts of interest law. DOE regulations do not prohibit exposing students to the complete spectrum of political ideologies. Similarly, OSI's investigation will determine whether plaintiff violated academic policy and conflict of interest rules."

It seems to me that is consistent with what they said

they were investigating on April 6th

MS. MIRER: That's true. That is the only place where it is consistent, your Honor.

But I do want to point out that really if you look at this closely, they are claiming that they are not investigating her for believing, but they are saying they are investigating her as to whether or not she used this position to advance a political party.

The political parties at issue in D130 are ballot-accessed political parties, not an organization that may or may not have any kind of basis for running an election or having run an election. That is number one. So we think that D130 can't be violated, and they don't have a right to investigate that.

Whether or not she has advanced the beliefs of a political party -- the thing that I got most incensed about, having myself a civil rights background and knowing, from <a href="Dombrowski v. Pfister">Dombrowski v. Pfister</a> forward, is that people who support civil rights and integration have often been called Communists.

So, when you put that together, this is really what is being investigated, her political belief, and whether or not she, as someone who has been outspoken on behalf of her students and fighting racism in society and in the school system, can have that label put on her or should have that label put on her to the point that it would be investigated.

That's what is bringing this case within the First Amendment, your Honor.

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Frankly, I don't see a difference. You're saying you can have the belief but you can't state what your beliefs are?

I'm sorry. That to me is the same thing as investigating the beliefs.

THE COURT: To repeat, I think what the city is alleging -- again, I don't know whether there is any basis for it or not -- the city is asserting that your client was recruiting students to join this political party and to participate in their activities. That is the complaint they say they received. That is the complaint they claim they are investigating. I understand your position that your client didn't do either of those things. But that is what they are saying they were told in the complaint they received and that's what they say they are investigating.

MS. MIRER: Your Honor, if it was anything else besides raising the specter of Communism, they would have been required to say how, who, what, when, tell me the dates and times, give me specifics, and they are not. That's why this investigation is so dangerous. That's why this investigation is so dangerous. We will, of course, address this in more detail.

THE COURT: Is it your contention that either the special commissioner for investigation or OSI knew about your

client's January 10, 2017, email at the time they opened this investigation? Is that your contention?

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MS. MIRER: Our contention is that they either knew about it or they could have easily found out and could have had constructive knowledge. Certainly by January 25, 2017, the DOE had knowledge of the allegations, and OSI is a part of DOE. There is no question that they would have had knowledge.

THE COURT: I'll hear from the city.

MS. MIRER: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. O'CONNOR: Thank you, your Honor. I'll be very brief.

With respect to the issues raised by your Honor that were addressed by plaintiff's counsel, with respect to the issue of whether or not the plaintiff was speaking as a concerned citizen on a matter of public concern, we share the same view that Matthews v. City is not on point, that it is distinguishable, and that the topics that were discussed in the January 10th email are squarely within her job duties as a principal in terms of allocating resources to her students and to advocate on behalf of the students for resources that she believes they are entitled to. Again, these are the job duties of a principal.

With respect to the chilling effect, it's counterintuitive to believe that there would be affidavits submitted
by teachers who say I am feeling chilled but not chilled enough

to not submit this affidavit, and that is essentially what the argument is. The case law is quite clear that there has to be an actual chilling of the First Amendment speech in order to suffice as irreparable harm.

THE COURT: Who do I look to to figure out whether there is a chilling effect? You have mentioned the five individuals who put in affidavits. Your adversary says there are lots of other people that weren't willing to put in affidavits because they are chilled by the initiation of this investigation. Who do you contend I look to in order to determine whether there is a chilling effect or not?

MS. O'CONNOR: With respect the allegations that there are unidentified teachers unwilling to come forward, obviously those allegations in the affidavits are hearsay. I understand we have an issue of how can we identify people who don't wish to be identified. But those are hearsay statements.

THE COURT: Do the rules of evidence apply to a hearing on a preliminary injunction? The answer is no, they don't. The answer is no, they don't.

MS. O'CONNOR: They are relaxed.

THE COURT: The answer is no, they don't. Again, I return to my original question, which is who do I look to to determine whether there has been a chilling effect? Do I understand you to be conceding that I can look at people who didn't submit affidavits who plaintiff alleges were chilled and

are sufficiently concerned about the initiation of the investigation that they wish to play no part in challenging what plaintiff says is discriminatory conduct taking place at the John Jay complex? Who do I look to?

MS. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I would ask you to look at this courtroom. You have indicated that the First Amendment expression at PSC is alive and well, and I think that this courtroom is evidence of that. So to the extent there is some allegation that the First Amendment rights of PSC employees, parents, students have been chilled, this very courtroom demonstrates otherwise.

With respect to unidentified teachers -- may I proceed, your Honor?

THE COURT: Please. There will be silence. Go ahead. (Continued on next page)

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MS. O'CONNOR: With respect to looking to unidentified teachers who refuse to come forward, again, the evidence that's in the record now suggests otherwise. We have five individual teachers who have put forth affidavits in relatively short order in support of this motion, one of whom is going to be questioned by OSI herself. And even in spite of that, she decided to put in an affidavit. The balance of the evidence certainly tips in favor of that there is no chill at all.

And with respect to the plaintiff individually, there is evidence that she has continued to engage in the same activities that she was before March 2, when she was advised of the OSI investigation. She met with teachers and parents wherein she discussed the investigation and her belief that it was retaliatory. It is our understanding that she was a speaker at a council sponsored by Park Slope Civic Council on March 30, again discussing school segregation. So she's continuing to engage in the same activities that she was engaging in, in advance of learning about the OSI investigation.

So I think, when looking at the evidence in the record, it overwhelmingly shows that there is no actual chill.

THE COURT: But are you conceding that in determining whether there is a chill, I can look beyond the plaintiff to consider others, for example, other employees of the DOE at PSC. Are you conceding I can look to them as well as the

plaintiff, in determining whether there's been a chilling of First Amendment rights?

MS. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, plaintiffs have cited to no such case law that can allow the Court to consider unidentified individuals in considering whether or not there has been an actual chill. I don't know how they can prove an actual chill without any evidence of such. So, no, I'm not conceding that.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

MS. O'CONNOR: With respect to, counsel also brought up the point that she believed that the fact that OSI essentially tabled or closed the complaints made in 2015 is evidence of retaliation. We would --

THE COURT: 2016.

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MS. O'CONNOR: 2016. Thank you, your Honor. We would argue that it's the exact opposite. If DOE's motives were retaliatory, why not move on the first allegation?

THE COURT: Well, but they're saying that the premise is that the urge to retaliate happened on or about January 10, 2017, when she sent the e-mail. That's their position. So the fact that they didn't take action against her in May 2016, from plaintiff's point of view, is kind of irrelevant because they're pegging the desire to retaliate on the January 10, 2017 e-mail. So that's their position.

MS. O'CONNOR: Well, also, your Honor, in looking at all of the plaintiff's affidavit, she has, according to her,

has a very long history of engaging in the same activities, over the course of a decade. So the activities have been going on for quite some time. The only difference here is that the OSI received an allegation against Ms. Bloomberg that they needed to investigate.

With respect to counsel's, essentially her questioning of why an OSI investigation was needed into these allegations, I mean, I think it's quite clear what counsel was describing was in fact an investigation. Interview witnesses, interview the film maker, find out whether or not there was a permit, look to the web site. This is the definition of an investigation and what OSI will do unless the Court stops the investigation in its tracks. This is what the DOE is trying to do. OSI is the entity within DOE that is charged with conducting the very investigations that counsel is describing.

THE COURT: Now, your adversary says that there is actually no chancellor's regulation that prohibits a principal or other employee of DOE from promoting political organizations during school hours. What regulation is it that you're relying — are you relying on this D-130 or are you relying on something else?

MS. O'CONNOR: Yes, your Honor, it's D-130, and I can hand a copy up to the Court.

THE COURT: That would be great.

MS. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, and I can direct your

attention to the bottom of the third page, subsection C, that's titled "Conduct of Officers and Employees."

THE COURT: Yes.

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MS. O'CONNOR: Plaintiff's counsel has represented that it seems to only apply when there is a specific candidate that is at issue. That's against the plain reading of subsection C.1, which refers to "a candidate, candidates, slate of candidates, or political organizations or committees." So it involves not just a particular candidate; it involves whole political organizations.

And to the extent that counsel is somehow arguing that it is impermissible for the DOE to impose --

THE COURT: Well, let's just stick with that for a second.

MS. O'CONNOR: Yes, your Honor.

"Accordingly, while on duty or in contact with students, school personnel may not wear buttons, pins, articles of clothing, or any other items advocating a candidate, candidates, slate of candidates, or political organization committee."

MS. O'CONNOR: Subsection 2, your Honor -- I should have pointed that out as well -- reads, "Personnel may not be involved in any activities, including fundraising on behalf of any candidate, candidates, slates of candidates, or any political/organization committee during working hours."

THE COURT: OK.

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MS. O'CONNOR: And to the extent plaintiff's counsel is contending that there is no basis for the DOE to require that its employees maintain a posture of political neutrality during working hours, that contention has been rejected by the Southern District in a case that's cited in our brief. It's Weingarten v. Board of Education, cited on page 25 of defendants' brief, that finds that the DOE does in fact have a legitimate pedagogical interest in avoiding partisan politics, essentially. So that contention has already been rejected by courts of this Circuit.

With respect -- and the only additional item I'd ask the Court is, since plaintiff is going to be permitted to submit a reply brief tomorrow, I would ask that defendants have the opportunity to review the brief and then request oral argument if needed, if we believe that there are any outstanding issues that we need to address with the Court, or we can, if the Court would prefer a surreply in lieu of an argument, that we be permitted to submit one.

THE COURT: You can review plaintiff's brief when you get it and then make an application, and I certainly will consider it. You should say in the application whether you want the opportunity to put in a letter or whether you want to argue points, and I will rule on the application.

What is your position on when SCI and/or OSI learned

of plaintiff's January 10, 2017 e-mail?

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MS. O'CONNOR: When OSI learned of the e-mail?

THE COURT: Either SCI or OSI.

MS. O'CONNOR: I can't speak for SCI. They are an entity separate and apart from DOE. In terms of when OSI learned of the e-mail, I can address that in a supplemental briefing. I can't say a specific date now. I do know, based on the declaration submitted by Ms. Guerra, that they were not aware of the e-mails at the time the decision was made to reopen the investigation.

THE COURT: All right.

So anything else you want to say?

MS. O'CONNOR: Unless your Honor has questions.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Mirer, anything else you want to say?

I guess there is one thing I would ask you to respond to right now, which is, I would have to make a finding of chilling effect. Are you really contending that your client has been chilled, and do the facts support that, given the fact that she's made a number of public statements about the matter, as I understand it, after she found out about the investigation?

MS. MIRER: She has said in her affidavit that she does feel chilled.

THE COURT: But subjective assertions of being chilled

aren't going to cut it. You have to look at what the facts are. And when someone continues to advocate for their position after an investigation of this sort has been initiated, it does raise the issue whether someone has actually been chilled or not. And this frequently comes up in First Amendment cases, where people say their rights have been chilled but yet they're advocating with the same vigor the point that they were advocating before the alleged retaliatory act took place. So it's a common question. It comes up in a lot of these cases: has the person been chilled or not and if so why are they basically saying the same things after the alleged retaliation.

MS. MIRER: First of all, the only thing that was alleged that she said after the fact was to -- after knowing of the investigation -- was to explain to the school community that her beliefs that this was a retaliatory investigation, the fact that she spoke at an outside forum, unrelated to her work at DOE, would not be evidence of her not being chilled. The fact that she was asked to speak at a forum on her views outside the DOE, which is what my co-counsel mentioned, is not something that would impact her conduct within the school.

THE COURT: Anything else you want to say?

MS. MIRER: I have two things. One is that, obviously we'll put this in our brief, but we do think that there is strong evidence of likelihood of success on the merits. And we would ask if the Court would, at least for now -- the

investigation is on hold, and if it would be possible to not have to have any of the school community go to investigations while this matter is pending, we would appreciate the Court asking the DOE to refrain until such time as we have the ability to have the hearing -- I mean have your Court's decision.

THE COURT: Well, let me tell you what I intend to do.

I've already given you the right to submit a reply, which I've asked you to submit by 5 o'clock tomorrow, addressing the five questions I had as well as anything else you want to say. And then the city will have an opportunity to request, either the opportunity to put in a surreply or to raise points that it wishes to make at oral argument. But it is my intention to rule on the matter at a 5 o'clock hearing on Wednesday, May 3. So the matter is not going to sit for a long time.

Anything else?

All right. We will issue an order with the schedule that I've outlined. If there's nothing else, we're adjourned.

MS. MIRER: Could I just clarify, until May 3rd, should there continue to be investigation --

THE COURT: Does the city have any intention of attempting to interview people between now and 5 o'clock on Wednesday, May 3?

MS. O'CONNOR: Certainly if the Court is instructing

H51ABL02ps us not to, we will not do so. THE COURT: Well, let me say this. I think any intelligent lawyer understands that when a matter is sub judice before the Court, it's probably not a great idea to take action? MS. O'CONNOR: Understood, your Honor. THE COURT: OK. MS. MIRER: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you both.